Southeast Asia bloc meets to press Thailand, Cambodia on truce
Southeast Asia bloc meets to press Thailand, Cambodia on truce

 As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) convened its latest high-level meetings this week, a familiar and vexing crisis dominated the agenda: the escalating civil war in Myanmar. However, a significant and pointed strand of diplomacy unfolded behind the scenes, with regional leaders intensifying pressure on two member states in particular—Thailand and Cambodia—to align their independent initiatives with the bloc’s official peace plan and to cease any actions that could undermine a collective push for a ceasefire.

For over three years, Myanmar’s post-coup crisis has been a festering wound on ASEAN’s credibility. The bloc’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC), agreed upon with Myanmar’s junta in April 2021, remains effectively dormant, with the military ignoring its core tenets of ending violence and engaging in inclusive dialogue. As the junta loses significant ground to a cohesive alliance of ethnic armed organizations and pro-democracy forces, the humanitarian and security fallout threatens to spill across the region’s borders.

This precarious moment has seen individual ASEAN members stepping into the diplomatic void, often with conflicting approaches. Thailand, sharing a long and volatile border with Myanmar, has pursued what it terms “humanitarian dialogue,” engaging directly with the junta and other stakeholders. Former Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai notably broke ranks in 2023 by meeting with junta representatives on the sidelines of a UN meeting, a move that drew criticism. More recently, Thailand’s proposal for a cross-border humanitarian corridor, while addressing a genuine need, is viewed with suspicion by parts of the resistance and some ASEAN colleagues as a move that could inadvertently legitimize the junta’s control over aid distribution.

Cambodia, under the leadership of the outspoken former Prime Minister Hun Sen and now his son, Hun Manet, has a more contentious history with the issue. In 2022, as ASEAN chair, Hun Sen unilaterally engaged with the junta, a move seen as undermining the bloc’s consensus to exclude junta leaders from high-level meetings. His actions set a precedent for division that ASEAN has struggled to heal.

At the current meetings, diplomats from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been particularly vocal in urging a unified front. “The message is clear: freelancing must end,” said a Southeast Asian diplomat involved in the talks on condition of anonymity. “Well-intentioned or not, independent missions by Thailand or Cambodia without full ASEAN coordination risk fracturing our position further and giving the junta opportunities to play divide-and-rule.”

The core of the pressure revolves around three key demands:

  1. Harmonization with the 5PC: Any national initiative, especially concerning humanitarian aid or dialogue facilitation, must explicitly support, not sidestep, the agreed-upon ASEAN plan. The fear is that the junta will use bilateral engagements to claim regional legitimacy while continuing its brutal campaign domestically.
  2. Inclusive Engagement: ASEAN’s official stance emphasizes the need to engage with “all parties” in the conflict. Thailand and Cambodia are being pressed to ensure their channels do not exclusively favor the junta but are transparent about contacts with the National Unity Government (NUG) and major ethnic armed groups.
  3. Prioritizing a Nationwide Ceasefire: With the junta on the defensive, regional leaders argue that the collective priority must be a verifiable cessation of violence as a precondition for any political process. Uncoordinated talks, they warn, could dilute this focus.

The stakes for ASEAN are existential. The bloc’s principle of non-interference is being tested like never before by a crisis that refuses to be contained. Its central role in regional security is being challenged by the actions of its own members and by the sheer momentum of the conflict on the ground.

The responses from Bangkok and Phnom Penh will be telling. Both nations cite pragmatic border management and humanitarian imperatives for their actions. However, succumbing to regional pressure and ceding their independent diplomacy to a collective strategy would signal a rare moment of reinforced ASEAN centrality. Conversely, continued divergence could publicly expose the cracks within the ten-member group, emboldening the junta and other external powers to further sideline the bloc in managing Myanmar’s future.

As one ASEAN minister privately noted, “Myanmar is not just a test of our ability to solve a problem. It is a test of our ability to even agree on how to approach it.” The meetings this week reveal a bloc in a strenuous effort to get its own house in order, recognizing that before it can hope to broker a truce in Myanmar, it must first cement one within its own ranks.

About The Author

By David